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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 3, 1995, Bruce Vemoff, age thirty-five, died unexpectedly as the
result of an adverse allergic reaction to a prescription medication.' Gabriela
* Catherine C. Hanson Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Newcomb
College of Tulane University (B.A. 1974); Emory University School of Law (J.D. 1981). Member, State Bar
of Georgia. Vice-President, American College of Trust & Estate Counsel (ACTEC). Professor Radford
thanks Georgia State University College of Law students Brian A. Becker and Eric M. Teusink for their
assistance in researching the background material for this article.
1. Brief for the Appellee at 8, Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-55049)
[hereinafter Brief for the Appellee]; Claire Bowles, You Don 't Need to Make Sperm or Even Be Alive to Be a
Father, BIO-MEDICINE, Mar. 24, 1999, at 1, http://news.bio-medicine.org/medicine-news-2/You-Dont-Need-
To-Make-Sperm-Or-Even-Be-Alive-To-Be-A-Father-I 1111-1/; Charles Arthur, Woman Is Pregnant by Sperm
of Dead Man, THE INDEPENDENT (London, England), July 16, 1998, at 1.
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"Gaby" Vemoff, his wife of five years, survived him.2 The couple had no
children at the time of Bruce's death. Gaby asked Dr. Cappy Rothman to
extract sperm from Bruce's body, and the procedure was successfully
performed thirty hours after Bruce's death. The sperm were cryopreserved.5
In 1998, Gaby Vernoff was successfully impregnated with her deceased
husband's sperm.6 She gave birth to a baby girl, Brandalynn Vernoff, on
2. Vemoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 8.
3. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105; Brief for the Appellee, supra note I, at 8. Mr. Bruce Vemoff did not
have a will. Id.
4. Bowles, supra note 1, at 1. Dr. Rothman extracted five vials of semen from Bruce Vernoff's body.
Vernoff, 568 F.3dat 1105; Brief for the Appellee, supra note I, at 8. In 1978, Dr. Cappy Miles Rothman was
the first man to perform a postmortem sperm extraction. Cappy Miles Rothman, Live Sperm, Dead Bodies,
20 J. ANDROL.456, 456 (1999). Unlike the Vemoff extraction, Dr. Rothman did not perform his first
extractions at the request of the decedent's spouse. Id. Dr. Rothman described his first cases as follows:
... I harvested sperm from a young man who had sustained fatal head injuries .... Although the
deceased was unmarried and without a fiancee, this man's father was greatly consoled by knowing
that viable sperm were restored. When I recovered sperm from another young man who had died
of a gunshot wound, his parents were obviously comforted when they saw motile sperm from
their son. Preserving part of the deceased let them identify with their lost son and allowed the
theoretical possibility of continuation of the patrilineal heritage.
Id. (footnote omitted). The sperm from Dr. Rothman's earlier extractions were not used for fertilization
because, among other reasons, "[tihe sperm were of poor quality, and after freezing and thawing, it would
have been unreasonable to anticipate progeny." Id. Upon Bruce Vemoff's death, Dr. Rothman had "already
carried out the extraction for the families of about a dozen dead men. In these cases, the families simply
wanted to keep the sperm as a memento, rather than to use it." Arthur, supra note 1, at 1. Dr. Rothman
described his motivation for granting Ms. Vermoffs request as follows: "'I just did it because the family was
in so much stress and so much grief."' BBC NEWS, Baby from Dead Husband's Sperm, Mar. 27, 1999,
http://news.bbe.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/305302.stm. "Dr. Rothman is the founder of the Center for Male
Reproductive Medicine and is the co-director and co-founder of the IVF Center at Century City Hospital" in
Los Angeles. Center for Male Reproductive Medicine website, Cappy Rothman, MD Facs, http://www.male
reproduction.com/biorothman.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2009). He is also "the medical director of the
California Cryobank, the world's largest sperm bank." Id.
At the time of Bruce Vernoff's extraction, his body had been refrigerated for thirty hours, which Dr.
Rothman reported as the longest time lapse that had occurred prior to a sperm retrieval. BBC NEWS, supra;
see also Steve Planchon, Comment, The Application of the Dead Man's Statutes in Family Law, 16 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 561, 561 (2000); Bowles, supra note 1, at 1; Arthur, supra note 1, at 1.
5. See generally E.E. Gottenger & H.M. Nagler, The Quagmire ofPostmortem Sperm Acquisition, 20
J. ANDROL. 458 (1999) (addressing issues pertaining to postmortem sperm retrieval including
cryopreservation). Sperm cryopreservation involves cooling extracted sperm in liquid nitrogen to sub-zero
temperatures for a specified period of time. John Hopkins Medicine Fertility Center, Embryo and Sperm
Cryopreservation, http://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/fertility/services/cryopreservation.html (last visited Sept.
11, 2009). Sperm cryopreservation is often utilized by men who are about to undergo cancer treatment.
Gottenger & Nagler, supra, at 458. Also, military personnel may choose to bank sperm prior to deployment,
in the event they do not return. Maria Doucettperry, To Be Continued: A Look at Posthumous Reproduction
As It Relates to Today's Military, ARMY LAW., May 2008, at 1, 1-2. See generally, Kristine S. Knaplund,
Postmortem Conception and a Father's Last Will, 46 ARIz. L. REV. 91, 93 (suggesting that sperm
cryopreservation and postmortem conception are likely to grow in popularity due to technological
advancements and increased availability). In 2004, the longest reported period of successful sperm
cryopreservation followed by a live human birth was 21 years. New Scientist, Baby born from sperm frozen
for 21 years, May 25, 2004, http/www.newscientist.com/articleldn503 1-baby-born-from-sperm-frozen-for-
21-years.html (referencing G. Home et al., Live Birth with Sperm Cryopreserved for 21 Years Prior to
Cancer Treatment: Case Report, 19 HuMAN REPROD. 1448, 1448-49 (2004), available at http./humrep.
oxfordjoumalsorg/cgi/content/full/191611448).
6. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105. She was impregnated using in vitro fertilization (IVF). Id.
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March 17, 1999. 7 Brandalynn was reputed to be the first baby born using
sperm extracted from her father's body after his death.8 At age ten, Brandalynn
was the focus of the first Circuit Court of Appeals case to decide whether a
child conceived in these circumstances is eligible to receive social security
benefits as a survivor of her father.9 On June 17, 2009, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in Vernoffv. Astrue, decided that Brandalynn was not
entitled to social security benefits.'
Postmortem sperm retrieval (PMSR) is the process of removing sperm
from the cadaver of a recently deceased male." Utilizing one of a number of
techniques, doctors are able to extract sperm from the decedent's body no later
IVF is a method of assisted reproduction in which a man's sperm and a woman's eggs are
combined outside of the body in a laboratory dish. One or more fertilized eggs (embryos) may be
transferred to the woman's uterus, where they may implant in the uterine lining and develop.
Excess embryos may be cryopreserved (frozen) for future use.
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Assisted Reproductive Technologies: A Guidefor Patients, at 4
(2008), available at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/patientbooklets/ART.pdf. Insemination by VF formerly
involved putting eggs and numerous sperm together into a laboratory petri dish or incubator. See, e.g., Cyrene
Grothaus-Day, From Pipette to Cradle, From Immortality to Extinction, 7 RUTGERS J. OF L. & RELIG. 2, 6
(2005); Machelle M. Siebel, Understanding the Medical Procedures and Terminology Surrounding
Reproductive Technology, ADOPTION AND REPRODUCTIVE LAW IN MAsSACHUSETIrS (2000), available at
http://faculty.law.miami.edu/mcoombs/documents/Siebel.ARTTechnologies.pdf. A newer form of IVF is
"intracytoplasmic sperm injection" (ICSI). ICSI is "the direct microinjection of a single sperm into a single
egg in order to achieve fertilization." UCSF Center for Reproductive Health, Intracytoplasmic Sperm
Injection (ICSI), http://www.ucsfivf.org/ucsf-icsi.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
Apparently, after one unsuccessful attempt to become pregnant, fifteen months after Bruce Vernoff's
death in 1995, Gaby Vernoff gave birth to Brandalynn in 1999. See Planchon, supra note 4, at 561; Bowles,
supra note 1, at 1; Arthur, supra note 1, at 1.
7. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105; Bowles, supra note l,at 1; Arthur, supra note l,at 1; BBC NEWS, supra
note 4.
8. See supra notes 1, 4. However, one report indicates that there was a child born in France from
posthumously-extracted sperm two years prior to Brandalynn's birth. BBC NEWS, supra note 4.
9. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1104-08. The opinion of the district court, rendered on November 13, 2007,
was sealed by the court; therefore, references to the district court's decision have been extracted from the
parties' briefs and the published opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
10. Id. at 1104.
11. See Susan Kerr, Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement: Is It Legal?, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 39
(1999); Ronald Chester, Double Trouble: Legal Solutions to the Medical Problems of Unconsented Sperm
Harvesting and Drug-Induced Multiple Pregnancies, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 451 (2000). Sperm retrieval is
sometimes referred to as "sperm procurement" or "sperm extraction" or "sperm harvesting." See Kerr, supra;
Chester, supra.
The postmortem retrieval of human eggs from deceased women has not yet been perfected. However,
most of the reasoning that is explored in this article would be applicable regardless of whether the decedent
was male or female. See, e.g., LISA V. BROCK & ANNA C. MASTROLANNI, SPERM AND EGG RETRIEVAL FOR
POSTHUMOUS REPRODUCTION: PRACTICAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS (David E. Battaglia &
Philip E. Patton eds., Humana Press 2005); Katheryn D. Katz, Parenthood from the Grave: Protocols for
Retrieving and Utilizing Gametes from the Dead or Dying, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 289, 296-97 (2004).
Similar issues arise with gametic material retrieved from an individual who is in a permanent state of
unconsciousness. See, e.g., Bryce Weber, Ron Kodama, & Keith Jarvi, Postmortem Sperm Retrieval: The
Canadian Perspective, 30 J. ANDROL. 407 (2009); Carson Strong, Ethical and Legal Aspects of Sperm
Retrieval Afier Death or Persistent Vegetative State, 27 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 347 (1999). The discussions in
this article will be limited to the retrieval of sperm from men who have already been pronounced dead.
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than thirty-six hours after death. 12  Typically, the sperm are cryopreserved
(frozen) for future use.' 3
The use of PMSR raises a host of legal, ethical, moral, and medical
questions. 14 These questions encompass a wide range of issues.15 Is it ethical
to extract gametic material from a human without his or her consent? 6 Is this
extraction a prohibited mutilation of a cadaver? 17 Who has the authority, if
12. See, e.g., Weber et al. supra note 11, at 407. Weber and his colleagues enumerate the following
techniques for retrieving sperm from human bodies: "surgical excision of the epididymis; aspiration and
irrigation of the vas deferens; electroejaculation; and orchidectomy." Id. (citations omitted); see also Kerr,
supra note 11, at 41-42 n.15-17; Study Results from Chaim Sheba Medical Center, Department of Urology
Provide New Insights into Life Sciences, HOSP. L. WKLY., Dec. 14, 2006, at 414 (describing seventeen cases
of PMSR performed within 7 1/2 - 36 hours of death).
13. Gottenger & Nagler, supra note 5, at 458 (describing the cryopreservation of sperm).
14. While there are no current statistics on the number of requests for PMSR, these requests are reported
to be "occurring with increasing frequency." Ethics ofPost-Mortem Sperm RetrievalDiscussedby New York-
Presbyterian Urologists, Apr. 26, 2003, http://nyp.org/news/hospital/81.html. A 1997 survey reported that
eighty-two requests were received in forty U.S. hospitals between 1980 and 1995, with about one half of these
requests occurring in 1995. See Kerr, supra note 11, at 45 (reporting that these numbers were "believed to be
conservative estimates"). Sperm retrieval has been requested by wives, fiancdes, girlfriends, parents, family
friends, intensive care workers, and social workers. See Katz, supra note 11, at 295-96. Kerr describes one
situation in which the widow originally requested the sperm removal, but when she decided not to use her
deceased husband's sperm to conceive, his mother then requested the sperm with the intent of herself
(presumably using a donor egg) bearing her own grandchild. Kerr, supra note 11, at 42. See generally
Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem Conception, Parental
Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 Hous. L. REV. 967 (1996); Chester, Double Trouble, supra note 6;
Doucettperry, supra note 5; Laura A. Dwyer, Dead Daddies: Issues in Postmortem Reproduction, 52
RUTGERS L. REV. 881 (2000); Susan N. Gary, We Are Family: The Definition of Parent and Child for
Succession Purposes, 34 ACTEC 171 (2008); Kristine S. Knaplund, Legal Issues of Maternity and
Inheritance for the Biotech Child ofthe 21st Century, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 393 (2008); Knaplund,
A Father's Last Will, supra note 5; Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Conceiving the Inconceivable: Legal
Recognition of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 34 ACTEC 154 (2008); Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising
from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation, 75 N.C. L. REv. 901 (1997); Strong, Ethical and
Legal Aspects, supra note 11; Carson Strong, Consent to Sperm Retrieval and Insemination after Death or
Persistent Vegetative State, 14 J.L. & HEALTH 243 (2000).
Some medical institutions have established guidelines for responding to requests for PMSR. See, e.g.,
Jennifer A. Tash et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval: The Effect ofInstituting Guidelines, 170 J. UROL. 1922,
1922-25 (2003) (describing the guidelines instituted at the Weill Medical College of Cornell University).
"The guidelines included [four] general considerations: 1) issues of consent, 2) medical contraindications,
3) resource availability and 4) a 1-year waiting period for bereavement and assessment of recipient." Id. at
1923 (citations omitted). See also The Ethics Committee for the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine, Posthumous Reproduction, 82 FERTILITY & STERHILIY SuPP. 1 (2004); Katz, supra note 11, at 289.
15. See infra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
16. See generally M.J. Parker, 'Til Death Us Do Part: The Ethics ofPostmortem Gamete Donation, 30
J. MED. ETHICS 387-88 (2004). At least one medical ethicist has likened this process to "raping someone
when he is dead." See Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J. MED.
ETHICS 35, 55 (2000) (quoting bioethicist Arthur Caplan). See also Barron H. Lerner, In a Wife's Request at
Her Husband's Deathbed, Ethics Are an Issue, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 7, 2004, at Fl, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/07/health/07essa.html.
17. On the treatment of dead bodies, see Mary L. Clark, Keep Your Hands Off My (Dead) Body: A
Critique of the Ways in Which the State Disrupts Personhood Interests of the Deceased and His or Her Kin in
Disposing of the Dead and Assigning Identity in Death, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 45 (2005); Frances Foster,
Individualized Justice in Disputes Over Dead Bodies, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1351 (2008); Tanya K. Hemandez,
The Property of Death, 60 U. Prr. L. REV. 971 (1999).
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anyone, to consent to PMSR? 18  Who has the authority to receive sperm
extracted through PMSR, and to what uses may the sperm be put?19 Should
PMSR be treated as an anatomical gift?20 Should the rules for extracting sperm
from deceased minors differ from those for extracting sperm from deceased
adults? 21 Is a man's sperm "property" that can be given away or devised?22
Does sperm have an economic value and, if so, what are the tax ramifications? 23
Can sperm be sold after the father's death? 24 May a child who is born using
posthumously extracted sperm inherit from the father?25  Is such a child
included in a class gift, either under the father's will or the will or trust of
another?26 Will that child be treated as a child of the father for purposes of
eligibility to bring a wrongful death lawsuit? 27  Do these children have
constitutional equal protection rights?28 If children conceived using PMSR are
allowed to take property from the father or others, or are entitled to government
death benefits, does this offer a financial incentive for women to retrieve a
man's sperm after he dies and become impregnated with it?29 If state laws
relating to PMSR differ, will this encourage "reproductive tourism" by people
who are seeking more advantageous treatment for their children? 30 What are
the social and psychological ramifications to a child who is born under these
18. See Katz, supra note 11, at 305-11.
19. Id.
20. See Kerr, supra note 11, at 61-70; Bethany Spielman, Post Mortem Gamete RetrievalAfier Christy,
ABA Health eSource, Vol 5, No. 2 (2008), http://www.abanet.org/health/esourceNolume5/02/spielman.html
(last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
21. See, e.g., Assisted Human Reprod. Act: Prohibited Activities, S.C. 2004, c.2, s. 9 (Canadian statute
prohibiting any person from obtaining or using sperm or ovum from a minor except for the purpose of
preserving the gametic material "for the purpose of creating a human being that the person reasonably believes
will be raised by the donor").
22. This question was raised in Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, in which a man, who
had banked sperm prior to committing suicide, devised the sperm to his female companion for her use, should
she desire to become pregnant after his death. Hecht v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 20 Cal. Rptr.
2d 275, 276-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). See generally William Boulier, Sperm, Spleen, and Other Valuables:
The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Certain Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693, 696-704 (1995)
(discussing how the Hecht decision began the process of recognizing the body as property).
23. See Jay Soled, The Sale ofDonors 'Eggs: A Case Study of Why Congress Must Modify the Capital
Asset Definition, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 919 (1999).
24. See http://www.spermbank.com/newdonors/index.cfln?ID-4 (stating that, during life, males are
offered money for the service of donating their sperm to sperm banks).
25. See James E. Bailey, An Analytical Frameworkfor Resolving the Issues Raised by the Interaction
Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of lnheritance, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 743 (1998).
26. See Knaplund, A Father's Last Will, supra note 5; infra note 71 and accompanying text.
27. See generally Susan E. Satava, Comment, Discrimination Against the Unacknowledged Illegitimate
Childand the Wrongful Death Statute, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 933 (1996) (analyzing the wrongful death statutes
and the states continued confusion of legitimacy classifications).
28. See, e.g., Kristi S. Knaplund, Equal Protection, Postmortem Conception, andIntestacy, 53 U. KAN.
L. REv. 627, 643 (2005).
29. Id. at 632-33.
30. See generally Rothman, supra note 4, at 456 ("limiting the procedure of postmortem sperm retrieval
will lead to the development of reproductive tourism because of regional (state- or country-imposed)
restrictions").
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circumstances? 3' The list of questions is virtually endless. This article focuses
on one small aspect of this multi-faceted technological development: The
entitlement of a child, conceived using posthumously retrieved sperm, to social
security benefits as a survivor of his or her father. Brandalynn Vemoff's case
provides an answer to that question, at least as it applies in cases that arise in
the State of California and the federal courts of the Ninth Circuit.
32
II. RELEVANT LEGISLATION
Although PMSR has been the subject of legislation in other countries, to
date, the United States federal government has not enacted any statute that
pertains specifically to posthumous conception or PMSR.33 However, some
state and uniform laws that deal more generally with the posthumous birth and
posthumous conception of children will have a direct impact on whether
children born of posthumously retrieved sperm will be able to inherit from their
biological fathers or be eligible for social security benefits as survivors of their
fathers.34
"Posthumous birth" will be used throughout this article to refer to the birth
of a child or other heir after the death of the parent or relative. "Posthumous
conception" will generally be used to refer to the impregnation of a woman by
sperm that the father banked during his life in anticipation of a possible
premature death. While children conceived and born from sperm retrieved
through PMSR are obviously the products of posthumous conception, the term
posthumous conception has more often referred to children conceived after a
parent's death through the use of sperm purposely banked by the father prior to
death, rather than from sperm extracted from the father's body after death.35
State and uniform laws that deal with posthumous birth and posthumous
conception fall into two categories. The first group of statutes, which includes
the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), deals generally with the parentage of
children.36 These statutes cover a number of issues that are not relevant to
31. See, e.g., Gottenger & Nagler, supra note 5; Katz, supra note 11, at 313-15.
32. Vemoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1111-12(9th Cir. 2009).
33. See, e.g., Assisted Human Reproduction Act: Prohibited Activities, S.C. 2004, c. 2, s. 8
(Consolidated Stats. of Canada); Human Fertilization & Embryology Act 2008, Ch. 22, s.39 (England). See
generally G. Bahadur, Death and Conception, Human Reprod. 117:10, 2769, 2771 (2002) (describing
legislation in European countries); Catherine Best, Vic. Parliament Upholds Use of Sperm from Dead to
Conceive, AAP Newsfeed, Australian Associated Press Pty., Ltd., Oct. 9, 2008 (describing proposed
legislation in Victoria, Australia); J. Dostal et al., Postmortem Sperm Retrieval in New European Union
Countries: Case Report, Human Reprod. 20:8 2359, 2360 (describing legal status ofPMSR in Hungary and
the Czech Republic); Judy Siegel-Itzkovitch, Israel Allows Removal of Sperm from Dead Men at Wives'
Request, BMJ Vol. 327 at 1187 (11/22/03) (describing Israel Attorney General's Guidelines on PMSR).
34. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 159-60; Gary, We Are Family, supra note 14, at 180-86; Knaplund, A
Father's Last Will, supra note 5, at 93.
35. Knaplund, A Father's Last Will, supra note 5, at 93-94.
36. See Knaplund, Biotech Child, supra note 14, at 401 (listing those statutes dealing specifically with
the parentage of posthumous children).
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inheritance rights, such as child custody and support responsibilities.37 The
second group of statutes, which includes the Uniform Probate Code (UPC),
deal specifically with the rights of children to share in their parents' estates or
otherwise be entitled to distributions due to their parents' deaths.38 As shown
in the later discussion of Vernoffv. Astrue, both types of statutes are relevant to
whether a child who is conceived and born using PMSR is eligible to receive
social security benefits.
39
A. Parentage Statutes
The UPA addresses a number of issues revolving around the parent-child
relationship, with a particular focus on the status of children who are born out
of wedlock.40 While the scope of the UPA is far broader than the distribution
of a parent's property at death, if a parent-child relationship is established under
the UPA, that relationship "applies for all purposes, except as otherwise
specifically provided" by another law of the state. 4' The UPA addresses the
paternity of both posthumously born children and posthumously conceived
children. A posthumously born child is presumed to be the child of a man if
the parents were married and the child is born within 300 days of the
termination of the marriage by the father's death.42 Under Section 201 of the
UPA, a father-child relationship is established if the man "consented to assisted
reproduction by a woman under [Article] 7 which resulted in the birth of the
child. ''43 Article 7 of the UPA is devoted to children who are conceived other
than "by means of sexual intercourse .... 44 Section 703 states that "[a] man
who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction by a woman as
37. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7613-7614 (West 2008) (addressing parentage of children resulting
from artificial insemination and child support issues).
38. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 160 (describing statutes specifically addressing posthumous children's
inheritance rights).
39. See discussion infra Part Ill.D.
40. The UPA is the "official recommendation of the [Uniform Law Commission] on parentage." UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note (2000) (amended 2002). The Commission (formally known as the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws or NCCUSL) has been addressing the issue of
parentage, particularly as it relates to children who are born out of wedlock, for almost 100 years. See id. The
first UPA was promulgated in 1973. See Unif. L. Comm'rs, Summary, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, http'//www.
nccusl.org/Update/uniformactsummaries/uniformacts-s-upa.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
The basic premise of the UPA is equal treatment of children regardless of the marital status of the
parents. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 202. The same approach was adopted for purposes of intestate
succession in the UPC. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114 (2006). See also Gary, We Are Family, supra
note 14, at 174 (describing the UPA).
41. UNIF. PARENTAGE AT § 203. See Gary, We Are Family, supra note 14, at 177. Professor Gary
explores the different treatment of children of assisted reproduction by the UPA and the UPC explaining that
"the UPC rules apply to the distribution of property after death, while the UPA rules may create ongoing
support obligations." Id.
42. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(2)-(3). Under UPA Section 204(aX3), this presumption prevails if
the couple thought they were married but the marriage turns out to be invalid or void. Id. § 204(a)(3).
43. Id. § 201(b)(5).
44. Id. § 701.
2009]
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provided in Section 704 with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent
of the resulting child. ' 4s Section 704 requires the consent to be in "a record
signed by the woman and the man."46 Under Section 707, even if a man or a
woman consented to be a parent, that individual is not considered to be the
child's parent if the individual died "before placement of eggs, sperm, or
embryos. ' 47 The only circumstance under which that individual will be
considered the child's parent is if "the deceased spouse consented in a record
that if assisted reproduction were to occur after death, the deceased individual
would be a parent of the child."A8 Thus, under the UPA, it appears that a child
who is born from sperm retrieved from the child's father after the father's death
is not considered to be the child of that father unless the father had actually
anticipated the sperm retrieval and left a written "record" in which he consented
to the use of his sperm for assisted reproduction. 49 A similar set of provisions
appears in the ABA Proposed Model Code Governing Assisted Reproduction.
50
Alabama, Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming adopted the UPA as amended in 2002." 1 Oklahoma, however,
did not adopt the provisions of Article 7 that relate to children of assisted
reproduction. 2
Promulgated in 1988, the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted
Conception Act (USCACA) specifically addressed parentage issues for children
conceived through assisted reproduction techniques.53 Section 4 prohibited
such children from being treated as the children of the deceased parent if the
parent died "before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived
other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's egg or sperm. 54
The Comment explains the section as follows:
[The section] is designed to provide finality for the determination of
parenthood of those whose genetic material is utilized in the procreation
45. Id. § 703.
46. Id. § 704(a).
47. Id. § 707.
48. Id.
49. See id.
50. ABA Fam. L. Sec. Comm. on Assisted Reprod. Tech. and Genetics, Proposed Model Code
Governing Assisted Reproduction, § 602 (2007), http//www.abanetorg/family/committees/artmodelcodefeb
2007.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2009). See generally Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., & Steven H. Snyder,
Clarifying the Law ofART: The New American Bar Association ModelAct Governing AssistedReproductive
Technology, 42 FAM. L.Q. 203,218-19 (2008) (stating that "[iut is not the intent of the Model Act to conflict
with or to supersede the provisions of either the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) or the Uniform Probate Code
(UPC)").
51. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-101 to -905 (1975) (effective Jan. 1, 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 13, § 8
(2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-01 to -66 (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. Tit. 10, § 7700 (West 2006); TEX.
FAM. CODE §§ 160.001-.763 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-1 5-101 to -902 (2005); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 26.26.0011-.913 (2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-401 to -907 (2003).
52. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7700 (West 2009) (lacking subsection applying to parentage of
children conceived through assisted reproduction).
53. See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT (1988).
54. Id. § 4.
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process after their death. The death of the person whose genetic material is
either used in conceiving an embryo or in implanting an already existing
embryo into a womb would end the potential parenthood of the deceased.
5 5
North Dakota, the only state to adopt this provision, repealed it in 2005.56 The
NCCUSL withdrew the USCACA in 2000 when promulgating the newest
version of the UPA.57
B. Inheritance Statutes
State inheritance laws have long recognized that a biological father may
die while the woman who is carrying his child is pregnant. 58 Inheritance
statutes generally allow posthumous children to inherit from the parent or other
relatives. 59 Posthumous conception is a more recent development that has only
been addressed in the inheritance laws of a few states. 60
As a general rule, only someone who is surviving at the death of a
decedent is eligible to take from that decedent's estate. 61 However, most states
have statutes that describe circumstances under which someone who is born
after the decedent's death may still share in the decedent's estate.62 Some of
the statutes that allow children born after the parent dies to inherit from that
parent state only that posthumous children are deemed to be living at the time
of the death of the parent. 63 The statutes do not define the term posthumous
children. 64 Arguably, because these statutes are silent on whether a
55. Id. § 4 cmt.
56. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (1989), repealed by 2005 N.D. Laws 135.
57. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPION Acr (1988), 9C U.L.A. 363 (2001), Refs. &
Annots. Despite the non-acceptance among the states and the NCCUSL's eventual withdrawal of the Act, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit referred to USCACA briefly in its opinion. See Vernoffv. Astrue, 568
F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009).
58. See, e.g., Groce v. Rittenberry, 14 Ga. 232, 237 (1853) (discussing the development of the English
rule that a child who is "en ventre sa mere"-iterally meaning "in the mother's stomach'"-is living at the
time of the parent's death).
59. See Lorio, supra note 14, at 159-61.
60. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2008); see also CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2009).
61. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(c)(1) (2008).
Upon the death of an individual who is survived by a spouse but not by any child or other
descendant, the spouse is the sole heir. If the decedent is also survived by any child or other
descendant, the spouse shall share equally with the children, with the descendants of any
deceased child taking that child's share, per stirpes; provided, however, that the spouse's portion
shall not be less than a one-third share ....
Id. (emphasis added). See also Khabbaz v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 930 A.2d 1180, 1183-84 (N.H. 2007)
(deciding that a child conceived after the father's death using stored sperm did not survive the father and thus
would not qualify as his intestate heir under the state statute referring to the "surviving issue").
62. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2009); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.730
(2005) (allowing child of assisted reproduction to inherit only if deceased recorded consent).
63. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2009).
64. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 474.050 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. § 132.290 (2009); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 228 (West 2009). In Delaware and West Virginia, a posthumous child is described
simply as a child "in the mother's womb." See DEL. CODE ANN. title 12, § 310 (2009); W. VA. CODE
2009]
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posthumously born child must be conceived prior to the parent's death, statutes
of this type would not preclude a child who was both conceived and born after
the parent's death from inheriting from the parent.65
Other state statutes use terminology that seems to expressly require that a
child who is born after a parent's death be conceived prior to the death of the
parent in order to be able to share in that parent's estate. 66 The pre-2008
version of the UPC, in Section 2-108, provides that a child "in gestation" at the
time of a parent's death is considered alive at the time of the parent's death, if
the child lives at least 120 hours after birth.67 The requirement in these statutes
and the UPC that a child be conceived or in gestation prior to the father's death
seem to preclude from inheritance a child whose father's sperm were not
extracted until after the father's death.68 However, in at least one case, a state
§ 42-1-8 (2009). The Kentucky statute speaks of a "child born ofa widow." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.070
(West 2009). The North Carolina statute speaks of"lineal descendants... born within 10 lunar months" of
the decedent's death. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (2009).
65. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 190, § 8 (West 2009). Prior to 2008, this law provided simply that
"[p]osthumous children shall be considered as living at the death of their parent." See Woodward v. Comm'r
of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 264 (Mass. 2002). In Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts determined that, because this undefined term contained no
requirement that a child "be in existence" at the decedent's death, children who were conceived after a
father's death from sperm that he had banked prior to undergoing chemotherapy would enjoy the same
succession rights as children conceived before their father's death. Id.
66. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-108 (2009) ("Relatives of the decedent conceived before
the decedent's death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent if the
relative lives one hundred twenty hours or more after birth.") (emphasis added); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)
(2009) ("[C]hildren of the decedent who are born after the decedent's death are considered children in being
at the decedent's death, provided they were conceivedprior to the decedent's death, were born within ten
months of the decedent's death, and survived 120 hours or more after birth .. ") (emphasis added). See also
ALA. CODE § 43-8-47 (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210 (2009); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6407 (West 2009);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-108 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 3-107 (West 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. 524.2-108 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2308
(2009); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUST LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.075 (2009); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-1-2 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-2-108 (2009);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 854.21 (West 2009); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-103 (2009). The Indiana and Ohio statutes
speak of a child "begotten" before the decedent's death. IND. CODE § 29-1-2-6 (2009); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2105.14 (West 2009).
67. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108 (2008). See also ALASKA STAT. 13.12.108 (2009); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2108 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-108 (2009); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2108
(2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-118 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-8 (West 2009); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-2-108 (West 2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-108 (2009). The 2008 amendments to the UPC have
moved this provision to UPC Section 2-104(aX2) and added the requirement that it must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence that the child lived 120 hours after the child's birth. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108.
68. For example, in Stephen v. Commissioner of Social Security, the district court pointed out that a
child whose mother had retrieved sperm from the father after the father's death and used that sperm to
become pregnant was not conceived prior to the father's death and thus was not an "afterborn heir" under
Florida Statute Section 732.106. Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (M.D. Fla.
2005); see infra text accompanying notes 103-06. See also Finley v. Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849 (2008)
(interpreting state intestacy statute that required a child to be conceived prior to the father's death to preclude
from inheritance a child born of an embryo that had been created during the parents' life but not implanted
into the mother until after the father's death). This question had been certified to the Arkansas Supreme Court
after the child appealed the Social Security Administration's denial of benefits to her. Id. at 852. In In re
Martin B., the judge of the Surrogate's Court of New York pointed out that a 2006 amendment to a New York
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statute that contained the term conceivedwas construed broadly so as to include
children born of sperm banked by the father while he was still alive, but not
used by the mother for conception until several months after his death.69
Additionally, the drafters of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and
Other Donative Transfers take the position that UPC Section 2-108, with its
reference to a child who is in gestation, does not preclude a child conceived
after the decedent's death from inheriting from the decedent's estate.70
In addition to the states that have adopted the UPA, four states-Virginia,
Florida, California, and Louisiana-have enacted statutes that explicitly address
posthumous conception. 71 As with the UPA, these statutes may expand and
clarify the inheritance rights of many posthumously conceived children, but
would most likely preclude any rights in children conceived using PMSR.72
The Virginia statute, which was enacted in 1991, is modeled in part after
USCACA, but the Virginia statute does not contain the USCACA blanket
statute to define an "after-born" as a child in gestation at the parent's death has been "specifically intended to
make it clear that a post-conceived child is excluded from sharing in the parent's estate .. " In re Martin B.,
841 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007). Despite this observation, the court did allow posthumously
conceived twins to share in a trust as the issue of their grandfather. Id. at 212. The court looked not to the
statute, as that dealt only with wills, but rather to the intent of the parents of the children. Id. at 211-12. The
court concluded that "ifan individual considers a child to be his or her own, society through its laws should
do so as well." Id. at 211. The court noted that the tentative draft of the restatement dealing with wills and
other donative transfers favored the inclusion of posthumously conceived children as members of the class of
children or issue of parents who had consented to function as parents but had been kept from doing so by
premature death. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 14.8 (Tentative Draft No. 4, at 207, 2007).
69. See In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.1 cmt. (d) (1999);
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108.
71. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1
(West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (West 2009). See supra text accompanying notes 40-49;
http://www.law.comell.edu/uniform/vol9.html (states adopting the UPA include Alabama, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming); see also B. 3571,2009 -2010 Assem., Re&
Sess. (N.Y. 2009) (not passed), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg?bn-A03571&sh-t. The bill
would have amended N.Y. Estate Powers & Trust Law by adding new section 4-1.3:
(A) For the purposes of this Article: (1) a child conceived posthumously within two years of the
date of death of his or her maternal progenitor shall be considered a non-marital child and the
legitimate child of such maternal progenitor, who shall be his or her mother for the purposes of
intestate succession; and such child may inherit from his or her mother and from his or her
maternal kindred, provided the provisions of paragraph (B) of this section are established. (2) A
child conceived posthumously within two years of the date of death of his or her paternal
progenitor shall be considered a non-marital child and the legitimate child of such paternal
progenitor, who shall be his or her father for the purposes of intestate succession; and such child
may inherit from his or her father and from his or her paternal kindred, provided the provisions of
paragraph (B) of this section are established.
B. 3571, 2009-2010 Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009). This proposed legislation, as introduced in 2007 as Bill
5181, is discussed in Robert Matthew Harper, Dead Hand Problem: Why New York's Estates, Powers, and
Trusts Law Should Be Amended to Treat Posthumously Conceived Children As Decedents' Issue and
Descendants, 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 267, 285-87 (2008).
72. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91:391.1 (creating a
writing requirement or extenuating circumstances to create inheritance rights); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158.
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prohibition against treating a posthumously conceived child as a child of the
deceased parent.73 The Virginia statute deals only with embryos, and thus, may
not apply in the case of PMSR.74 The statute provides that a court should not
consider an individual who dies before the implantation of "an embryo
resulting from the union of his sperm or her ovum with another gamete" as the
parent of the resulting child unless that individual consented "to be a parent in
writing executed before the implantation. 75
The Florida statute deals more broadly with eggs, sperm, and pre-embryos
but substantially restricts the circumstances under which a child posthumously
conceived from these gametes may take a portion of the parent's estate.76 This
statute provides that a "child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or
persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm or preembryos to a
woman's body" may only take from the decedent's estate if the decedent
provided for that child in the decedent's will.77 It is unlikely that a man who
has not banked sperm prior to his death would write a will in which he
contemplated the birth of posthumously conceived children.78 Thus, the Florida
statute would prohibit the child from taking in almost every, if not every, case
involving PMSR.79
Under the California statute, adopted in 2006 (long after Brandalynn's
birth in 1999 in California), a child who is conceived after the parent's death is
deemed to be born during the decedent's life (and after the execution of all of
the decedent's testamentary instruments) if clear and convincing evidence
shows the following: (1) the parent specified in writing that his or her genetic
material could be used for the posthumous conception of a child; (2) the person
whom the parent had designated to control the genetic material gave written
notice that the parent's genetic material was available for posthumous
conception; and (3) the child was in utero, using the parent's genetic material,
within two years of the parent's death.80 The California statute does not use
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (West 2009) (first enacted in 1991 by Va. Acts 1991, ch. 600); see supra
text accompanying notes 53-57 (discussing USCACA).
74. § 20-158(B).
75. Id. The individual also would be treated as a parent if "implantation occurs before notice of the
death can reasonably be communicated to the physician performing the procedure." Id.
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4).
77. Id. In Stephen v. Commissioner of Social Security, the court used this statute to deny a child social
security benefits. Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2005); see also infra
text accompanying notes 103-06.
78. See generally Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1257 (discussing the limited occurrence of the decedent
providing for a posthumously conceived child in a will).
79. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(4) (requiring strict guidelines for a child conceived through PMSR to
be treated as an heir).
80. CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West 2009); see infra Part II.D. (discussing the California statute). The
writing had to be dated and signed by the parent, could be amended or revoked by the parent, and must have
designated a person who would control the genetic material. § 249.5(a). The notice had to be given by
certified mail within four months of the decedent's death to the "person who has the power to control the
distribution of either the decedent's property or death benefits payable by reason of the decedent's death." Id.
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81gender specific pronouns nor does it refer to the decedent's spouse. On the
other hand, the Louisiana statute refers to a decedent who has left specific
written authorization for "his surviving spouse to use his gametes.,1 2 If a child
is born under these circumstances within three years of the father's death, the
child will have all rights, "including the capacity to inherit from the decedent,"
that the child would have had if the child had been living at the decedent's
death. 3 Again, as it is unlikely that a man who has not banked sperm during
his life will have left a written consent for use of his sperm after his death, the
California and Louisiana statutes would most likely preclude inheritance by a
child whose father's sperm were retrieved by PMSR. s4
In 2008, the UPC was amended to include expanded provisions that
address the parent-child relationship.85 New UPC Section 2-120 deals with the
inheritance rights of children conceived by assisted reproduction.86 As with the
UPA and the other state statutes described above, new Section 2-120(f) treats a
child born through assisted reproduction as the child of the individual whose
gametes were used if that individual consented in a signed writing to be treated
87
as the parent of the child. However, that is not the sole method that an
individual may use to establish the parent-child relationship.8 The new Code
section contemplates that such a signed record may not exist, but that the
decedent's "actions [may] speak as loud as words."89 The decedent's consent
to be treated as a parent may be shown if the decedent "functioned as a parent
of the child no later than two years after the child's birth" or intended to do so,
§ 249.5(b). The California statute expressly does not apply to a child produced by human cloning. Id.
§ 249.5(c).
81. See § 249.5.
82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1 (2008).
83. Id. § 9:391.1 (a). The statute allows others whose share in the decedent's estate may be reduced by
the birth of the posthumously conceived child one year in which to contest the child's paternity. Id.
§ 9:391.1(b).
84. See discussion supra Part ll.B.
85. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. IL Pt. 1, general cmt. (2008) (explaining that the amendment was
partially in response to issues raised by assisted reproduction); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115(2) (defining
assisted reproduction as "a method causing pregnancy other than sexual intercourse," which mirrors UPA
Section 102). See also Gary, We Are Family, supra note 14, at 177-82 (discussing a wide-range of issues
surrounding the parent-child relationship covered by the 2008 amendment to the UPC).
Professors Ronald Chester and Susan Gary offered proposals that led up to the enactment of these new
UPC provisions. See Ronald Chester, Posthumously-Conceived Heirs Under a Revised Uniform Probate
Code, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 727 (2004); Susan N. Gary, Posthumously-ConceivedHeirs: Where the
Law Stands and What to Do About It Now, 19 PROB. & PROP. 32, 32, Mar.-Apr. 2005.
86. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-120 (2008).
87. See § 2-120(f) (stating that the signed document need not specifically say that the parent agrees to be
treated as the parent as long as "all facts and circumstances" evidence this consent). The comment to
§ 2-120(0 cites In re Martin B. as an example of a record that would evidence intent the form signed by the
father. In re Martin B., 841 N.Y.S.2d 207 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2007). The form in this case did not speak of the
father's intent to be treated as a parent but rather that he gave his wife all rights to the cryopreserved sperm.
Id. at 211-12. See also Gary, supra note 14, at 184.
88. See, e.g., § 2-120(f).
89. Id. § 2-120 cmt. f.
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but was prevented from doing so by death or incapacity. 90 Finally, in the case
of a posthumously conceived child, if the decedent's intent to be treated as a
parent is shown by clear and convincing evidence, the parent-child relationship
can be established.9' Additionally, under new UPC Section 2-120(k), a
posthumously conceived child must either be "in utero not later than 36 months
after the individual's death [] or born not later than 45 months after the
individual's death. 9
The Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers
goes further than the UPC or any of the current state statutes in protecting the
rights of a posthumously conceived child.93 The drafters state that the
"Restatement takes the position that, to inherit from the decedent, a child
produced from genetic material of the decedent by assisted reproductive
technology must be born within a reasonable time after the decedent's death in
circumstances indicating that the decedent would have approved of the child's
right to inherit., 94 Thus, the drafters' position indicates that the decedent need
not have left a writing that allowed his sperm to be used for posthumous
reproduction, but rather, only that the circumstances indicate his approval or
consent to the birth of a child who could inherit from him.95 Furthermore, the
lack of a specified time period for conception or birth would allow the court to
look at each case of posthumous conception on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether the birth of the child took place within a "reasonable time
after the decedent's death., 96 The Restatement approach could allow a child
conceived through sperm retrieved by PMSR to inherit from the father.97
"Circumstances indicating that the decedent would have approved of the child's
right to inherit" might include a case in which the stated plans of a newly
married couple to have children are shattered by the sudden death of the
90. Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(A)-(B).
91. Id. § 2-120(f)(2)(C).
92. Id. § 2-120 cmt. k (explaining that the 36-month period is designed to allow time for grieving, for
reaching a determination as to whether to have a child, and for making several attempts at doing so and the
45-month alternative is offered because assisted reproduction techniques are sometimes not performed at a
clinic that would keep accurate records of the date of conception). See Gary, We Are Family, supra note 14,
at 184 (addressing whether the time limits may cause cases of induced labor).
93. See supra text accompanying note 70.
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5, cmt. 1(2000)
(explaining that a "clear case" would be one in which the decedent's widow uses his frozen sperm to become
pregnant after his death). The Restatement endorses the UPA concept that a child be considered the child of
his or her "genetic parents, whether or not they are married to each other." Id. § 2.5(l). Additionally, the
Restatement addresses class gifts and provides that, unless there is evidence of a different intent on the part of
the parent, a child who is born by means of assisted reproduction is included in the class of the parent's
children if the parent consented to function as the child parent. Id. § 14.8 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2001). See
also supra text accompanying note 67. See generally Melissa B. Vegter, The "ART" ofInheritance: A
Proposal for Legislation Requiring Proof of Parental Intent Before Posthumously Conceived Children Can
Inherit from a Deceased Parent's Estate, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 305-09 (2003) (discussing artificial
reproductive technologies and recommending an amendment to the UPC).
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 2.5 (2000).
96. Id. § 2.5 cmt. 1.
97. See id.
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father.98 Another situation may include a couple trying to conceive a child,
either through natural or assisted reproductive techniques, at the time of the
father's death.99
I. PMSR AND SOCIAL SECURITY: THE CASE OF VERNOFF V. ASTRUE
The application of the statutes described above to PMSR has played out
not in the context of inheritance cases, but rather in cases in which the mothers
of posthumously conceived children have sought social security survivors'
benefits for the children conceived and born after their fathers' deaths. I00
Despite some willingness in the past on the part of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) and the courts to allow social security benefits for
children born from sperm their fathers banked prior to death, both the SSA and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have drawn the line at the receipt for
benefits by children whose fathers' sperm were harvested after death by
PMSR. 10'
98. See Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2005). In the Stephen
case, the husband died of a heart attack only a month after the couple was married. Id.; see infra text
accompanying note 113. One news report, relating to Brandalynn Vemoff's birth, indicated that Gaby
Vemoffhad a video of her husband talking about his desire to have children. Charlotte Maden, U.S. Soldier's
Widow Takes Sperm After His Death, Progress Educational Trust, Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.ivf.net/iv/fVus_
soldier s_widowtakes sperm after his death-o3340.html. However, the briefs that were filed in the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit contain no mention of this evidence. See, e.g., Brief for the Appellee, supra
note 1. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also stated that there was "no agreement, or even evidence
of [Bruce Vernoff's] consent or intent." Vemoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009).
99. See, e.g., Mike McKnight, Benefits Denied to Girl Conceived After Father's Death, WOWT.com
Omaha, Oct. 24, 2008, http://www.wowt.com/news/headlines/33256169.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2009).
This circumstance is illustrated by the story of a Nebraska mother currently fighting the Social Security
Administration's denial of benefits to her child, who was conceived just seven days after the father died. Id.
The couple engaged in the process of assisted reproduction. Id. According to the widow, her husband told
her to "keep up with the fertility treatments so we could have a child of our own, even if he couldn't be here."
Id.
100. See, e.g., id.
101. In the first social security case that involved a child conceived posthumously from sperm banked by
her father, Hart v. Shalala, the Social Security Administration initially denied benefits to the child, but, prior
to the district court handing down an opinion to the contrary, acquiesced in the award of benefits. Hart v.
Shalala, No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. 1994). See also Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional
Conceptions: Social Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. LA. L REV.
251,255-56 (1999); Doroghazi, John, Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart and Unanswered Questions About Social
Security Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 1597, 1603 (2005).
For excellent discussions of the cases relating to social security benefits and children conceived after
the father's death from sperm banked by the father during his life, see Donald E. Shapiro & Benedene
Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, I J.L. & HEALTH 229
(1985); Ronald Volkmer, Posthumously Conceived Children Eligiblefor Social Security, 31 EST. PLAN 564
(2004); Banks, supra; Doroghazi, supra; Gary, We Are Family, supra note 14; Knaplund, Equal Protection,
supra note 28; Knaplund, A Father's Last Will, supra note 5; Knaplund, Biotech Child, supra note 14; Lorio,
supra note 34.
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A. Determining Eligibility for Social Security Benefits: The Basic Test
The SSA has been called upon twice to address the status of a child
conceived from sperm extracted from the child's father after the father's
death. 10 2 In both cases, the SSA refused the child's request for benefits.,0
Both cases were appealed to the federal courts.' 4 The first decision, Stephen v.
Commissioner of Social Security, arose out of a case in Florida, and was dealt
with easily by the court because Florida had a statute that was directly on
point.105 The second case was Vernoffv. Astrue.10 6
In determining the right of a child to receive social security benefits, the
Social Security Act indicates that both state and federal rules may govern
eligibility. 10 7 Section 402(d)(1) of the statute allows social security benefits to
be awarded to a child of a wage earner if the child is an unmarried minor and is
dependent upon the wage earner at the time of the wage earner's death.
10 8
Under Section 416(e), a child includes "the child or legally adopted child of an
individual."' 1 9 Section 416(h)(2) of the statute goes on to provide that, in
determining whether a child is the child of the wage earner, the Commissioner
"shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of
intestate personal property by the courts of the State" in which the wage earner
was domiciled when he died."0 This reference to state law caused the first
federal courts that examined the eligibility of posthumously conceived children
to receive social security benefits to certify to the state courts of the father's
domicile whether the posthumously conceived child could inherit under the
laws of that state.I"' The federal court used this approach in the Stephen case,
102. See Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1260; Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105.
103. See Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1260; Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105.
104. See Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1260; Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105.
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (West 2009); Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
106. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1102.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2006).
108. Id. Under 42 U.S.C. Section 402(d)(3), a child is deemed dependent on each of the child's parents
unless the parent is not living with the child at the time of the parent's death and the child was neither the
legitimate nor adopted child of the parent. Id. § 402(d)(3).
109. Id. § 416(e). The term also includes a stepchild who was the individual's stepchild at least nine
months prior to the individual's death and certain grandchildren or step-grandchildren of the individual. Id.
110. Id. §416(h)(2).
111. See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). In Woodward, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts construed the state's intestacy statute to allow children born from
sperm that their father left in a sperm bank to inherit under the state laws of intestacy if their mother could
prove their genetic relationship with the father and that the father consented to the posthumous reproduction.
Id. at 272. The decision was a response to the certification to the court by the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts of whether these children would enjoy the same inheritance rights under
Massachusetts law as natural children of a decedent. See Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259. A similar case was
addressed by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division in 2000. See In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d
1257, 1258-59 (N.J. Super. Ch. 2000). The twins whose social security benefits were at issue were born
posthumously after their mother was impregnated with sperm that her husband had deposited in a sperm bank
before undergoing chemotherapy. Id. While pursuing her claim through the SSA, the mother also brought a
claim in the state court to determine whether the twins were the heirs of their father. Id. The Superior Court
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which was the first social security case to examine the rights of a child
conceived with sperm retrieved from the father after the father died.'
1 2
The Stephen case involved a man who died of a heart attack in 1997,
roughly a month after he and his wife married1 13 Mr. Stephen's wife arranged
to have sperm extracted from his body the day after he died., 14 After several
attempts, Mrs. Stephens gave birth to a son in 2001.5 She applied for social
security benefits on behalf of her son. 16 As noted above, the Social Security
Act directs the Commissioner to determine whether a child is the child of a
decedent by looking to the state law that governs the "devolution of intestate
personal property."'" 7 The district court looked to the Florida law prohibiting a
posthumously conceived child not provided for in a decedent's will from
making any claim against the decedent's estate, and the court determined that
the child in the Stephen case was ineligible for social security benefits."8 The
court pointed out that the child's status was not governed by the Florida law
allowing a posthumously born child to inherit, because that law deals
specifically with a child who was conceived prior to the decedent's death. " 9
B. Determining Eligibility for Social Security Benefits: The Gillett-Netting
Test
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Vernoff, without limiting
itself to the clearly defined method of determination used in the Stephen case,
used two tests to determine possible eligibility for social security benefits.
20
The first test was the basic test described above, which looks to state intestacy
law, and the second test was the Gillett-Netting test, which applies to cases in
the Ninth Circuit. 12 1 The Gillett-Netting test was available in deciding the
Vernoff case because the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the only
federal circuit court that addressed the issue of posthumously conceived
looked to the legislative intent of New Jersey's intestacy statute and determined that the twins were indeed
encompassed by the statute as heirs of their father. Id. at 1262-63.
112. See Stephen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2005). The child
whose rights were at issue in the Stephen case was born in 2001, two years after Brandalynn Vemoff's birth.
Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1259; see also Vernoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009). However,
while Gaby Vemoff was seeking judicial review of the SSA's denial of benefits for Brandalynn, the Ninth
Circuit decided Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105; see also Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart,
371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Consequently, the district court remanded the Vernoffcase back to the SSA for
reconsideration in light of the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105.
113. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1259.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1999).
118. Stephen, 386 F. Supp. 2d at 1264-65.
119. Id. at 1264, n.8 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (West 2009)).
120. Vemoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105-12 (9th Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 1105-09.
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children's rights to social security benefits.122 Gillett-Netting involved twins
posthumously conceived by sperm deposited by their father in a sperm bank
after he learned that he must undergo chemotherapy for cancer. 12 3 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not use state intestacy law in this case to
determine whether the twins were the children of their father. 124 Instead, the
court of appeals determined that the direction in Social Security Act Section
416(h) to look to state law for a definition of child came into play only if the
parentage of the child was disputed. 25 As there was no question whether the
Gillett-Netting twins were the biological children of their father, their parentage
was not in dispute. 12 6 Thus, there was no need to resort to Section 416(h) and
its discretion to look to state intestacy law to determine whether the twins were
in fact the children of their father.
27
After concluding that the twins were the children of their father, the court
looked to Section 402(d)(1) of the Social Security Act to determine whether the
twins were dependent on their father and thus satisfied the second prong of
eligibility. 128 The court of appeals stated that the twins could not demonstrate
actual dependency because the children were not yet born at the time their
father died. 12 9 However, the court went on to state that the children could be
"statutorily deemed dependent on [the father] without proving actual
dependency."' 30 Section 402(d)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act provides that
a child is "deemed dependent upon his father" unless "such child is neither the
legitimate nor adopted child of such individual.'' Section 402(d)(3) ends
with a sentence that provides that a child "deemed to be a child of a fully or
currently insured individual pursuant to Section 416(h)(2)(B) .. . shall be
deemed to be the legitimate child of such individual.' 32  Citing Section
402(d)(3), the court again bifurcated the inquiry: A child is either legitimate
under the relevant state parentage law or, if not, the child could still be deemed
legitimate under Section 416(h)(2) of the Social Security Act if the child was
"entitled under the intestacy laws of the insured parent's domicile to inherit
personal property from the parent."' 133 The court turned first to the relevant
state parentage law (the law of Arizona, which was the father's domicile at
122. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 596 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004).
123. Id. Following the Gillett-Netting decision, SSA reconsidered and confirmed its original order that
Brandalynn Vemoff was not eligible for social security benefits. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1106.
124. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 596.
125. Id. at 597.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 597-98.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A) (2009).
132. Id. § 402(d)(3).
133. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598 (quoting Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 527, n.1 (1976)). The
bifurcation between state parentage statutes and state intestacy statutes is the same bifurcation as that set forth
previously in Part I of this article. See supra Part I.
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death) to determine whether the Gillett-Netting twins were the father's
legitimate children. 134 Noting that Arizona parentage law no longer makes a
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children, the court said that
every child in Arizona is "the legitimate child of its natural parents."' 35 The
court also pointed out that if the father was alive, then he would bear the
obligation to support the children.136 Having determined that the twins were the
legitimate children of the father under Arizona parentage law, the court of
appeals concluded that Section 402(d)(3) of the Social Security Act
conclusively deemed the children dependent on the father and entitled to
benefits. 137 Because the Gillett-Netting twins were their father's legitimate
children under Arizona parentage law, the court of appeals determined that it
did not have to examine whether the children were entitled to take his personal
property under the state's intestacy laws. 138  Phrased differently, because the
children were deemed dependent under Section 402(d)(3), the children did not
have to prove that they were deemed dependent under Section 416(h). 139
C. The Social Security Administration's Response to Gillett-Netting
Following the Gillett-Netting decision, the SSA issued a Social Security
Acquiescence Ruling (SSAR). 140 In this ruling, the SSA stated that, solely in
cases that arose in states or territories that are in the Ninth Circuit, the SSA will
determine that "a biological child of an insured individual who was conceived
by artificial means after the insured's death is the insured's 'child' for purposes
of the Act.' 14' Furthermore, in these states, the SSA will not apply Section
416(h) of the Social Security Act (with its reference to state intestacy laws) to
determine the status of the child.142 "In addition, if the child is considered
legitimate under State law," the SSA will consider the child legitimate for
134. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598.
135. Id. at 599 (quoting AZ. REV. STAT. § 8-601 (LexisNexis 1975)). Under the Arizona statute, "every
child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to support and education as if born in lawful
wedlock." § 8-601.
136. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.2d at 599. The Court pointed out in a footnote that had the children been
conceived from the sperm of a donor who was not married to the mother, Arizona law would likely not require
the donor to support the children and the Social Security Act likely would not have deemed the children
dependent. Id. at 599, n.7.
137. Id. at 599.
138. See supra text accompanying note 117.
139. Gillette-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599. 42 U.S.C. Section 402(d)(3), according to the court, provides that
legitimacy is a matter of state law, even though 42 U.S.C. Section 416(h) offers alternative ways to deem a
child legitimate even if the state law does not recognize the child as such. Id. (construing 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(d)(3) (2009)). Consequently, there was no need to resort to the other methods of proving legitimacy set
out in the Social Security Act. Id.
140. S.S.R. (70 Fed. Reg. 55656-01 2005).
141. Id. The states and territories within the Ninth Circuit include Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, and Washington. Id.
142. Id.
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purposes of the Act and thus deemed dependent upon the father. 143 The SSA
noted that all of the states in the Ninth Circuit, except Guam, had eliminated
any distinction between children who are legitimate as opposed to illegitimate,
and replaced this distinction with a system of parent-child rights that exist
regardless of whether the parents are married when the child is born.144 Thus,
these children need only establish that "an individual is his parent under state
family law provisions.' 14 After the SSAR, two legal mechanisms for
determining whether a posthumously conceived child is eligible to receive
social security benefits existed. 46 If the child's father was domiciled in the
Ninth Circuit, the Gillett-Netting approach is applied. 147 On the other hand, if
the child's father was domiciled in any other state, the state intestacy law
approach of Section 416(h)(2)(A) is applied. 48 Under this bifurcated regime
the court decided the Vernoff case.149
D. Vernoffv. Astrue
As previously noted, Brandalynn Vemoff, the child whose benefits were at
issue in the Vernoff case, was born four years after her father's death from
sperm extracted from the father's body after he died. 15 In the year the child
was born, Gaby Vemoff applied for social security benefits on behalf of the
child, claiming the child was a survivor of Bruce Vernoff.151 SSA denied the
claim, after which Gaby Vemoff sought relief in the district court. 52 While the
Vernoff case was pending in the District Court for the Central District of
California, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit handed down the Gillett-
Netting decision, and the SSA issued its SSAR."' At that point, the district
court remanded the Vernoffcase back to the SSA for reconsideration in light of
these developments. 54  In December 2006, the SSA affirmed its earlier
decision to deny benefits to Brandalynn. 55 In an unpublished opinion, the
district court issued ajudgment in favor of the SSA. 156 Apparently applying the
approach taken by the court of appeals in Gillett-Netting, the district court
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. This phrase from the SSAR was quoted with added italic emphasis by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Vernoffv. Astrue. Vemoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009).
146. See Brief of the Appellee, supra note 1, at 4.
147. Id.
148. In its brief in the Vernoffcase, the SSA stated that it continues to apply state intestacy law, as
directed by Section 416(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act, when deciding cases that arise outside of the
Ninth Circuit. Id at 4 n.1.
149. See Vernoff, 568 F.3dat 1105-11.
150. See supra text accompanying notes I-10.
151. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 1. This opinion was delivered on November 13, 2007. Id.
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determined that Brandalynn could not prove that she was a dependent of her
father. 57 The district court also looked to California law, both as it existed
prior to 2006 and as amended in 2006, and decided that Brandalynn was not
Bruce Vernoff' s natural child and, thus, could not prove dependency as
required by the Social Security Act.
158
In the Vernoff case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit faced the
challenge of construing not only the federal law but also California law in
determining Brandalynn's entitlement to benefits. 159 As in Gillett-Netting, the
threshold question was whether Brandalynn was a child of her father for
purposes of Section 402(d)(1) of the Social Security Act. 160 The court noted at
the outset that Brandalynn would be considered her father's child as a
consequence of the reasoning set forth in the Gillett-Netting decision and the
SSAR because there was no dispute that Brandalynn was her father's biological
child.16' However, as the court pointed out, "that determination does not end
our inquiry.'' 162 The determinative question was whether Brandalynn was
dependent upon her father when he died.163 The court observed that there were
three methods by which Brandalynn could prove the required dependency:
(a) show actual dependency (which, of course, was not possible as
Brandalynn's father had died long before she was born); (b) establish that
Bruce Vernoff was her parent under California law, which would satisfy the
requirements of the SSAR and Gillett-Netting; or (c) show that she could
inherit under the California laws of intestacy, which would satisfy the
requirements of Section 416(h)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act.164 In
discussing the third method, the court of appeals signaled that the method
described in the SSAR and Gillett-Netting was not the exclusive means for
establishing eligibility in states that are in the Ninth Circuit, but rather an
additional means that could be used if the preferred method of the SSA (that is,
showing intestacy rights, as required by Section 416(h)(2) of the Social Security
Act, which has been referred to earlier in this article as the basic test) could not
be satisfied.
65
157. Id. at 2.
158. Id. at 12.
159. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105-12.
160. Id. at 1105.
161. Id. Both parties agreed that Brandalynn was the father's biological child. See Brief for the
Appellee, supra note 1, at 27; Brief for the Appellant at 16, Vemoffv. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)
(No. 08-55049) [hereinafter Brief for the Appellant].
162. Vernoff, 568 F.3dat 1106.
163. Id. As described above, Section 402(d)(1) of the Social Security Act requires the applicant both to
be the child of the wage earner and to have been dependent upon the wage earner when he died. 42 U.S.C.
§ 402(d)(1) (2009) construed by Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1106-07.
164. Vernoff,568F.3dat 1110.
165. Id.; see also supra Part III.A.
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1. Application of the Gillett-Netting Test: California Parentage Law
The court of appeals began its analysis by applying the SSAR and Gillett-
Netting test of determining whether Bruce Vemoff was Brandalynn's parent
under California parentage law. 166 California, like Arizona, enacted a statute
that defines parentage without reference to the marital status of the parents.
167
The statute provides that a parent-child relationship exists between a child and
the child's "natural or adoptive parents.' 68  However, unlike Arizona,
California has other statutes that further define the concept of parentage,
particularly as it relates to a child's natural father. 169  Prior to 2006, the
California Family Code listed five conditions under which a man is presumed
the natural father of a child.170 Brandalynn's situation did not meet any of these
conditions.171 The court of appeals agreed with Brandalynn's contention that
these five conditions were not the exclusive conditions for determining whether
Bruce Vernoff could be Brandalynn's natural parent. 172 The court went on to
state that Brandalynn had failed to establish in any other manner that Bruce
Vemoff was Brandalynn's natural father. 173 The court of appeals also pointed
out that California law did not equate biological parenthood with natural parent
status. 74 In fact, according to a California case cited by the court of appeals,
"[a] biological father can be a presumed father, but is not necessarily one; and a
166. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1106.
167. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601 (West 2009) (replicating Section 1 of the UPA prior to the 2002
amendments); cf. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-601 (LexisNexis 1975). See also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6450 (West
2009) (granting intestacy rights to a child, regardless of the marital status of the child's natural parents).
168. § 7601.
169. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601 (West 2009) (defining natural children and addressing
posthumously conceived children). The irony is that Brandalynn would probably be considered her father's
legitimate child under Arizona's bare-bones statute while the detail in California's statute may well preclude
her from receiving social security benefits.
170. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2004). In 2007, the court held that application of this statute
resulted in an unconstitutional violation of equal protection. In re Mary G., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007). The court's finding is not relevant to posthumously conceived children.
171. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1107-08. The conditions are as follows: (i) the parents were married and the
child was born within 300 days of the termination of the marriage by death or disability; (2) the parents
attempted a valid marriage in apparent compliance with the law; (3) the parents married or attempted to marry
after the child was born and the father consented to be listed on the child's birth certificate or otherwise
support the child; (4) the father received the child into his home and openly held the child out as his child; or
(5) the child resided in a nation that engaged in an Orderly Departure Program and the father had declared
under penalty of perjury that he was the child's father. § 7611. The court of appeals described these
conditions and noted particularly that the closest one to Brandalynn's situation was the first condition, except
that Brandalynn had not been born within the required 300 days. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1107-08.
172. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1109. In the Appellant's Brief, Brandalynn's lawyers pointed first to California
Family Code Section 7610, which states that a parental relationship "may" be established "under this part."
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 163, at 22; see also § 7610. The appellant also pointed out other sections
of the California Family and Probate Codes indicating that the statutes are meant to be construed broadly
when determining natural parent status. Brief for the Appellant, supra note 161, at 26; see, e.g., § 7630(c)
(allowing an action to determine a parent-child relationship for a child with no presumed father under Section
7611).
173. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1109.
174. Id. at 1108.
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presumed father can be a biological father, but is not necessarily one."' 175
California law instead looks to the presumptions laid out in its Code and is
guided by the best interests of the child.176 Again quoting a California case,
the court of appeals noted that California took the approach that "every child
knows-the parent-child relationship is not spun from DNA."'
177
The court of appeals also examined the California statutes relating to
artificial insemination to determine whether Brandalynn's parentage could be
established under one of these statutes. 178 California Family Code Section
7630(c) allows an action to establish a father-child relationship if none of the
presumptions under Section 7611 are met. 79 However, the provisions of
California law which the court would consider to establish the paternity of a
child conceived through artificial insemination all revolve around the basic
presumption that the father consented to the insemination. 180 Because this
essential ingredient was missing, the court concluded that the statutes dictated
against a finding that Bruce Vernoff was Brandalynn's natural father under
California law. 81 For example, California Family Code Section 7613 presumes
a husband to be the father of a child who is conceived through artificial
insemination even if the sperm is not the sperm of the husband, provided the
husband consented to the insemination.1 82 The court of appeals said that
"[c]onsent is lacking here."'' 83 An expression of intent on the part of the
biological father is also a necessary element in California Family Code Section
7630(f), which allows a "party to an assisted reproduction agreement" to bring
an action "to establish a parent and child relationship consistent with the intent
expressed in that assisted reproduction agreement."'' 84 Once again, the court of
appeals noted that in Brandalynn's case there was "no agreement, or even
evidence of [Bruce Vernoff's] consent or intent.,'185 The court pointed out that
consent was so central to establishing a parent-child relationship because
"consent... demonstrates a willingness to support the child and an intent to
create the child."'186 The court noted that, in Gillett-Netting, the mother was
able to show that the decedent had not only consented to her having his child,
but was also able to show the decedent's willingness to support the child. 87 As
neither of these could be shown by Gaby Vernoff, the court concluded that
175. Id. (quoting In re T.R., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215 (2005)).
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting In re Jerry P., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)).
178. Id.
179. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(c) (West 2009).
180. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1109.
181. Id. at 1109-10.
182. § 7413(a).
183. Vernoff, 568 F.3d 1109.
184. § 7630(f).
185. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1109.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1109-10 (discussing Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 599 (9th Cir. 2004)).
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"Brandalynn does not fall under the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Gillett-Netting
and the subsequent SSAR."'
' 88
2. Application of the Basic Test: California Intestacy Law
Having determined that Brandalynn was not entitled to social security
benefits under the test set forth in Gillett-Netting and the SSAR, the court of
appeals reverted to the use of the test for determining eligibility that universally
applied prior to the holding in Gillett-Netting.89 As noted above, grounded in
Section 416(h)(2) of the Social Security Act, this test applies "such law as
would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property
by the courts of the State" in which the wage earner was domiciled when he
died. 90 Thus, the court of appeals examined California intestacy law to
determine whether Brandalynn would be eligible to share in Bruce Vernoff's
estate. 191 At the time Brandalynn filed her claim, the California Probate Code
defined child as any individual entitled to take from a parent by intestate
succession under the Code and parent as any individual entitled to take by
intestate succession from a child. 92 The Code provided that any share in an
intestate decedent's estate that did not pass to the surviving spouse or domestic
partner would pass to the decedent's issue. 93 The Code also contained three
provisions relevant to posthumously-born children: Sections 6407, 6450 and
6453.194 To make matters more complicated, in 2006, California's Family and
Probate Codes were amended to provide explicit circumstances under which
posthumously conceived children could inherit from their biological fathers. 95
The court of appeals looked at all of these statutes and pointed out that the
burden was on Brandalynn to prove that at least one of these provisions
specifically included her as an intestate heir. 196
As the court of appeals noted, California law contains a provision that
allows a child born after the decedent's death to inherit but only if the child was
188. Id. at 1110.
189. Id.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2) (2004); see supra Part M.A.
191. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1110.
192. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 26, 54 (1990).
193. §6402.
194. §§ 6407, 6450, 6453; see also Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1110.
195. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1110.
196. Id. Brandalynn's lawyers had asserted that the burden was on the SSA to prove Brandalynn's
exclusion from inheriting under the state's intestacy laws. Id. The court of appeals pointed out that they had
"misplace[d] the burden, which is on Brandalynn to establish her eligibility." Id. The court went on to say
that their argument also "misconstrue[d I the nature of intestacy law, which excludes from inheritance any
person not specifically included." Id.
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"conceived before the decedent's death.' 97 The court rejected Brandalynn's
attempt to expand this law to allow all posthumously born children to inherit.
198
The California Probate Code contains statutes relating to the parent-child
relationship that mirror those of the California Family Code. 199 California
Probate Code Section 6450 recognizes a parent-child relationship for intestacy
purposes between the child and the child's natural parents regardless of
whether the parents were married when the child was born.2 ° California
Probate Code Section 6453 defines the term natural parent for intestacy
purposes. 20 1 This statute recognizes the presumptions of parentage that are set
forth in California Family Code Section 7611.202 As noted above, the court of
appeals already determined that Brandalynn's situation did not meet any of
these presumptions.2 3 The California Probate Code also provides that a parent-
child relationship may be established by an action brought under California
Family Code Section 7630, but only if certain conditions are met.
Brandalynn could not possibly meet the first two of these conditions because
the conditions involve actions that took place during the father's life-either an
order entered during the father's lifetime or the father openly holding the child
out as his own.20 5 The third condition under which an action to establish
paternity could be brought is if "[i]t was impossible for the father to hold the
child out as his own and paternity is established by clear and convincing
evidence. ' '206 The court of appeals looked to California cases that had applied
this "impossibility" condition and found it was limited to situations in which
either (1) the father died after the child was conceived but before the child was
born; or (2) the child's mother or a third party physically prevented the father
197. § 6407.
198. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 11 10. State courts that have examined similar statutes have construed them in
different ways. See, e.g., In re Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). This argument was
successful in this New Jersey case construing a similarly-worded statue to apply to a child born using sperm
that the father banked prior to his death and the mother used for insemination after the father's death. Id. at
1263-64. On the other hand, in Finley v. Astrue, the court held that the state intestacy statute, which required
that a child be conceived prior to the father's death, precluded from inheritance a child born using an embryo
created during the parents' life but not implanted into the mother until after the father's death. Finley v.
Astrue, 270 S.W.3d 849, 853 (2008). The court of appeals made a passing reference to the Finley case and no
reference to the Kolacy case. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1110.
199. Compare CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6450-6450 (West 2009) with CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7600-7614 (West
2009).
200. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6450.
201. Id. § 6453.
202. Id.; see also supra note 173.
203. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1107-08.
204. § 6453(b). See also CAL. FAM. CODE 7630(c) (allowing for an action to determine the existence of a
father-child relationship to be brought if none of the presumptions of California Family Code Section 7611 are
met).
205. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453(b)(l)-(2).
206. Id. § 6453(b)(3).
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from holding the child out as his own.2°7 The court decided that it need not
determine whether to expand the impossibility provision to include a
posthumously conceived child because such an expansion would only result in
allowing Brandalynn to bring an action under California Family Code Section
7630, and the court already concluded that she would not prevail in such an
201
action.
California Probate Code Section 6453(c) also allows a natural parent and
child relationship to be established through the application of California
Probate Code Section 249.5.209  As noted above, the amendments to
California's Family and Probate Codes, which relate to posthumously
conceived children (including new California Probate Code Section 249.5)
were not enacted until after Brandalynn's birth. 1° Section 7611 of the
California Family Code was expanded in 2006 to provide that a man is
presumed to be the natural father of a child if "[t]he child is in utero after the
death of the decedent and the conditions set forth in Section 249.5 of the
Probate Code are satisfied., 211 New Section 249.5 of the California Probate
Code deems a posthumously conceived child to have been born within the
decedent's lifetime if the decedent had specified in writing that his or her
genetic material could be used for the posthumous conception of the child,
certain notice requirements are met, and the child "was in utero using the
decedent's genetic material and was in utero within two years of the date of
issuance of a certificate of the decedent's death., 21 2 The lack of any written
consent by her father and the timing of Brandalynn's conception and birth
preclude her from inheriting from the decedent under California Probate Code
Section 249.5 even if it had been enacted prior to her birth.213
After examining the amended California Family and Probate Codes, the
court of appeals proclaimed that "we do not generally decipher previous
legislative intent based upon subsequent legislation.... " 214 However, it noted
that the California courts decided a case prior to these amendments that gave
this court "insight as to how California courts interpreted the intestacy
207. Vernoff,568 F.3d at 1110 (citing Cheyanna M. v. A.C. Nielsen Co., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335,347 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1998) (father died after conception but before birth) and In re Jerry P., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123, 137
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (father physically prevented from holding the child out as his own)).
208. Id. at 1102; see supra text accompanying notes 149-52.
209. § 6453(c).
210. Compare § 249.5 (effective Jan. 1, 2005) with Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1105 (Brandalynn was born
Mar. 17, 1999).
211. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (West 2009), invalidated by In re Mary G. 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2007) and In re Jerry P., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 123 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
212. CAL. PROBATE CODE § 249.5 (West 2009). It would seem that this law would either supplement or
supersede California Probate Code Section 6407, which provides that "[r]elatives of the decedent conceived
before the decedent's death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the
decedent." Id. § 6407.
213. See id. § 249.5.
214. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1111.
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provisions prior to the passage of § 249.5.,,215 In Hecht v. Superior Court, the
court awarded a man's frozen sperm to his girlfriend, yet predicted that a child
resulting from impregnation would unlikely be able to inherit from him.216
The Hecht court cited the USCACA provision that provides that a posthumous
child born through artificial reproductive techniques is not the child of the
individual who provided the sperm, egg, or embryo.217 The court concluded
from Hecht that California would take a very narrow view when determining
the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children.218
E. Equal Protection Argument
Even after the court of appeals decided Brandalynn was ineligible to
receive social security benefits under the applicable federal and state laws, it
still needed to address whether the refusal to grant benefits was a denial of the
equal protection that is guaranteed Brandalynn under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 219 The court's initial inquiry
dealt with what level of scrutiny to apply to the government's actions in this
case.220 Equal protection claims are typically subject to one of three levels of
scrutiny: (1) strict scrutiny, which is reserved for cases involving race and
national origin discrimination and thus would not be appropriate in this case;
(2) intermediate scrutiny, which is applied to discriminatory classifications
based on gender or legitimacy; or (3) rational basis scrutiny, which is the lowest
level of scrutiny and applies in all other cases.22 1 In determining whether to
apply intermediate scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny, the framing of the
classification used by the government is important.222 Here, the court had to
decide if the classification, and resulting denial of benefits to Brandalynn, was
215. Id.
216. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); see also supra note 22.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57. The USCACA was not enacted by the State of
California. See Vernoff, 568 F.3d at I 11.
218. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
219. See Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address Equal
Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CoNN. PUB. INT. L.J. 234 (2005)
(providing an extensive discussion of the equal protection rights of posthumously conceived children);
Knaplund, Equal Protection, supra note 28.
220. See Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1112.
221. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504-06 (1976) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to a case
involving the denial of social security benefits to non-marital children); Brief for the Appellant, supra note
161, at Part V. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1976); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
The Supreme Court of the United States has also applied an "insurmountable barrier test" to classifications
based on legitimacy, striking down state laws that make the marital status of the child's parents an
insurmountable barrier to the child's vindication of rights or receipt of benefits. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762 (1977); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
222. See Goodwin, supra note 219, at 243-45.
2009]
60 ESTATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 2:33
one based on legitimacy or lack thereof, or simply one based on distinctions
among various subclasses of posthumously conceived children.
223
Brandalynn argued that the denial of benefits was based on legitimacy and
that the court of appeals should apply intermediate scrutiny.224  This
classification requires that the disallowance of benefits be substantially related
to an important government objective. 2 5 The court of appeals, however, agreed
with the SSA that the appropriate level of scrutiny in Brandalynn's case was
226
rational basis scrutiny. 6 Under rational basis scrutiny, the government needed
only to prove that its classification reasonably related to a legitimate
government purpose.227 The SSA explained that its refusal to grant benefits in
this case was not grounded in a classification based on legitimacy. 28 Rather,
the distinction was among various subclasses of posthumously conceived
children.22 9 Those born within a certain period of time after the father's death
or with the father's written consent that the sperm can be put to such a use are
entitled to social security benefits. 230 Those posthumously conceived children
whose fathers did not consent or who were not born within the statutory time
period will not receive benefits. 231 The SSA posited that this distinction is
reasonably related to the government's legitimate interest in using reasonable
presumptions to limit social security benefits to those children who have lost a
parent's support.232 Agreeing, the court of appeals cited Mathews v. Lucas, in
which the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the Social
Security Act provision that did not provide nonmarital children with the same
presumption of dependency provided to legitimate children did not violate the
Fifth Amendment Equal Protection clause.233 The distinction was justified
because the Social Security Act is designed to provide support to children who
are dependent upon the parent at the parent's death, and the presumption that a
legitimate child was dependent upon the parent reasonably promotes
administrative convenience.234
An underlying theme of the Vernoffcase was whether the Social Security
Act would be construed broadly enough to encompass most, if not all,
223. Id.
224. See, e.g., Trimble, 430 U.S. at 774 (holding that a state statute that allowed legitimate children to
inherit from both parents, but allowed nonmarital children to inherit only from their mothers, violated the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection mandate). See also supra note 141. Commentator Julie Goodwin
argues that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to any state law that deals with the inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children. See Goodwin, supra note 219, at 271-80.
225. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
226. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1112; see Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 33-39.
227. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509 (1976).
228. Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1112.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1107-08.
231. Id.
232. See Brief for the Appellee, supra note 1, at 33-39.
233. Vernoff 568 F.3d at 1112 (citing Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,509(1976)); see also supra text
accompanying notes 112-13.
234. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 509.
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biological children of a decedent, or construed somewhat more narrowly to
exclude some children because of the timing of their births or the circumstances
of their conceptions.235 Obviously, the drafters of the Social Security Act,
which was enacted in 1935 and expanded in 1939 to include benefits for
dependent children, did not contemplate a world in which children would be
bom years after their parents' deaths, let alone from sperm that were harvested
after the father had died.236
IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Vernoff case, at least half of the social security cases that
involved posthumously conceived children granted benefits to those children.2 37
In Gillett-Netting, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that "the
Act is construed liberally to ensure that children are provided for financially
after the death of a parent."' 238 However, the Vernoff case is the one at which
the judicial system has drawn the line. This line was previously drawn by the
legislatures of those few states that adopted statutes dealing with posthumously
conceived children. 239 Realistically, in none of those states would a child
conceived following PMSR inherit from the father because all of those states
require some type of written consent, approval, or acknowledgement by the
father that his genetic material may be used after his death to produce
children.240 Thus, the Vernoff decision is not a surprising one, although it is
one that will continue to have ramifications in those states that have not yet
dealt legislatively with the concept that children can be conceived and born
after the death of a parent-even without any prior knowledge by the parent
that such a child would be conceived. The decision balances the need to
protect children who are, or would have been, dependent upon their parents for
support with the necessity of limiting government support to a reasonably
foreseeable and manageable class of children.
235. See generally Vernoff, 568 F.3d at 1111 (noting that the timing of the birth and lack of consent to
use sperm could change the child's ability to receive social security benefits).
236. Social Security Amendments Act of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360 (1939).
237. For cases decided in favor of the child's receipt of benefits see Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d
593 (9th Cir. 2004); Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257 (2002); In re Estate of
Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). For cases not allowing benefits see Finley v. Astrue,
279 S.W.3d 849 (2008); Khabbaz v. Commissioner of Social Security, 930 A.2d 1180 (2007); Stephen v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 386 F. Supp. 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
238. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598 (citing Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1987) and
Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982)).
239. See discussion supra Part Bl.A.
240. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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